UNDERSTANDING SYRIAN MIGRATION TO TURKEY:
RE-VISITING HUNTINGTON'S PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT: Since the social demonstrations in Syria gave way to the civil war, the world has once again entered a period of crisis. International politics and humanitarian crises constitute the two most important consequences of the Syrian civil war, and many international organizations are making sufficient/insufficient efforts to solve the problems that have developed under these two major crisis types. While some studies have preferred to discuss the reflections of Syria on the international political arena through its impact on the foreign policies of the countries concerned, some studies have conducted research on its effects at the regional and global level. However, especially after 2013, there has been a significant increase in the number of studies evaluating the Syrian civil war by focusing on terrorist organizations. This crisis arises from the problem of how the Syrian migration flows affect/will affect the internal relations of the receiving country.

INTRODUCTION

Since the social demonstrations in Syria gave way to the civil war, the world has once again entered a period of crisis. International politics and humanitarian crises constitute the two most important consequences of the Syrian civil war, and many international organizations are making sufficient/insufficient efforts to solve the problems that have developed under these two major crisis types. While some studies have preferred to discuss the reflections of Syria on the international political arena through its impact on the foreign policies of the countries concerned, some studies have conducted research on its effects at the regional and global level. However, especially after 2013, there has been a significant increase in the number of studies evaluating the Syrian civil war by focusing on terrorist organizations. Beyond these, there is research that seeks to understand the dynamics of the Syrian crisis. However, there is another type of crisis that is not discussed much, and it is clear that as the Syrian civil war drags on, it will take up more space in the agenda of the countries that receive immigration. This crisis arises from the problem of how the Syrian migration flows affect/will affect the internal relations of the receiving country.

When the problem of immigration-domestic policy comes to the fore, the most emphasized issue is how to achieve integration. In our opinion, the main reason why this problematic comes to mind first is to ensure that immigrants do not cause any problems in terms of social order in the shortest and easiest way. Because it has a high potential to cause important problems in terms of economic, cultural, political and legal life in the lands where a human community with a different culture enters. A community does not necessarily have to come from a different culture to be a foreigner. Even if they have the same cultural ties, many factors such as coming from a different ethnic background, speaking a different language, having different traditions are sufficient reasons for a group to be seen as foreign. Even if all of their characteristics are the same, even dealing with people with whom you did not share the same land, income, and life before may be enough to make those people look foreign. Considering the finding of Simon and Lynch (1999) that "the majority of citizens do not have positive thoughts about existing immigrant groups" (Janoski & Wang, 2013, p. 697), in order to avoid potential problems in terms of social order within the legitimate borders of the state, host The problem of how to ensure integration between the society and the foreign community as soon as possible is at the top of the agenda of the decision-making mechanisms.

Although the issue of integration has become the main agenda item, this is generally due to the influence of the decision-making mechanism. On the agenda of the academic world, migration has been dealt with more in line with its political and sociological results and explanations. Especially at the end of the 1990s, many important studies have been put forward in this field. Some of these are Brubaker's work "Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany" published in 1992; Soysal's 1994 book "Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe"; Favell's book "Philosophies of Immigration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Germany" published in 1998; Freeman's article "Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states" published in 1995; Fitzgerald's 1996 book The Face of the Nation: Immigration, the State and National Identity; Gimpel and Edwards' book titled "The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform" published in 1999, Carter et al.'s research named "The 1951-1955 Conservative government and the racialization of black immigration" in 1987, Hansen's published in 2000 His book titled "Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britian The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation", "Im-

migrants, Markets and States: The Political Economy of Post War Europe" presented by Hollifield in 1992 for the benefit of researchers, and "The Political Economy of Post War Europe" in 2000. the Politics of International Migration", Tichenor's book titled "Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America" published in 2002 and Geddes's "The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe" published in 2003 " is his book. The main purpose of these studies is to explain the dynamics of migration and to show how policies should be developed for migration, starting from different theories. But the main common point in all of them is that they put either immigrants or settled society at the center of their analysis. It is one of the basic thoughts that dominate our article that this analysis is not correct about the Syrians in Turkey. Because the migration flow of Syrians in Turkey is that a very large mass migrated in a short time. Therefore, as these studies reveal, it is not a matter of individuals arriving piecemeal over a long period of time, but rather a mass migration that took place in a short period of time. Therefore, this article considers that the issue of Syrians in Turkey should not be evaluated in the light of either classical or modern migration theories.

The main problem in this article is to be able to read more systematically the impact of the immigrant mass on domestic politics, instead of producing policy recommendations on how to achieve integration. As Hansen stated, "Immigrant British immigration policy studies have been weak theoretically, and most, if not all, studies have not gone beyond being descriptive" (Hansen, 2000, p. 10). It would not be wrong to say that the theoretical weakness in question for England is also valid for many countries in the world. However, with a theoretical approach, it is believed that it will be easier to identify possible areas of conflict between the settled society and the immigrant population and to prevent these conflicts through proactive policies. On the other hand, when focusing only on developing integration policies, it is inevitable to develop various pre-acceptances for either the settled or immigrant community. In integration studies, the acceptance of either the host society or the foreign community as a homogeneous structure is considered necessary for the competence and intelligibility of the work. As a result of the studies carried out with the assumption of homogeneity, it is not possible to carry out the integration in a healthy way, because different communities in the society always have conflicting interests or demands.

Since the collapse of the Weimar Republic, which was established after the Nazi takeover of Germany, the theory of civil society began to explore how it could resolve the differences between interest groups at the institutional level, rather than homogenize society even if it was around democratic values. If the homogeneity presupposition is not developed, the existence of different structures under the two sides will emerge, in which case it becomes almost impossible to develop integration policies. Because the policies regarding which of the non-homogeneous parties will be taken as the center and which wing of the other side will be integrated become unclear. As a result of this, it is inevitable to reach results that do not comply with the dynamics of real life, when viewed only from the point of view of the integration process. On the other hand, from the perspective of integration, how the immigrant community can adopt the culture, language and lifestyle of the settled community is taken into account, and therefore the immigrant community is considered in a passive position. However, the immigrant community is likely to have some constructive/modifying role on the settled society. Therefore, the relationship between the sedentary community and the migrant community is not a process where the former can be considered active and the other passive.

There is a need for a systematic perspective on the influence of the migrant community in the domestic political environment or the ways in which it is included. However, the article in your hand thinks that while creating this theoretical approach, it would be more accurate to look at it from a theoretical perspective on how the current social order works, rather than a theory about how immigrants are or may be included in the social order. Because understanding the impact of immigrants on the social order is only possible through understanding the existing social order.

For this reason, in your article, instead of a theoretical approach towards immigrants, a theory aimed at understanding the social order has been centered. In this way, it will be possible to understand more clearly how the Syrians in Turkey can affect the social order, and a proposal will be presented regarding the integrated theory gap that Turkey, which has become a country of immigration, needs. If today it is not fully understood how immigrants affect Turkey's domestic political order, it will be necessary to look back to understand how immigrants can affect Turkey's foreign policy in the future. Because the main reason why immigrants are politically active in the countries they migrate to is to influence the policies of the host country towards the country they migrate to (Koslowski, 2005, p. 1).

HUNTINGTON'S SYSTEMATICS OF POLITICAL ORDER

Huntington (1968) put forward a systematic view of the domestic political order. Huntington's main thesis is that political instability is inevitable in the absence of a political institutionalization that can meet the rapid social change and mobilization of new groups (Huntington, 1996, p. 4). Huntington put forward this thesis in his study titled "Political Order in Changing Societies", which investigates the causes of coups and violence, especially in Latin American and Asian countries after the Second World War, and the main issue that is tried to be explained is the real reason for the instability in Latin American and Asian countries where the coup took place. , 1996, p. 5). Although there are important criticisms of Huntington's theoretical assumptions (Lieberman, 2002), it is one of the basic assumptions of our article that the resident-immigrant relationship constitutes a system that can still be used today, since the cause of the problems in Huntington's systematic can be attributed not to conditions but to general social dynamics. Of course, some elements in this systematic need some revisions. However, the emergence of this need does not change our opinion that systematics helps to understand the general domestic political and social order of a country. As a matter of fact, in the article at hand, the mentioned need will be tried to be met and Huntington's systematics will be adapted to our basic problematic with the fulfilled need.

Before going into the details of the systematic in question, it is necessary to briefly mention why Huntington's systematic was preferred in order to develop a systematic perspective on the resident-immigrant relationship. The first reason, as stated in the previous paragraph, is that Huntington's systematics can be adapted to the present day with some definitional revisions. The main points of Huntington's systematics have a content that deals with issues that still pose great problems today. Political instability, political institutionalization, social mobilization and mobility opportunities constitute these main points. These are concepts that are frequently emphasized and reevaluated under the new conditions of the world . Dealing with these concepts in a systematic way by associating them with each other is a contribution to eliminate possible confusions when dealing with a complex relationship such as the resident-immigrant relationship. Thanks to a few definitional revisions to be made, this systematic can be brought to a

content that can shed light on the present.

The second reason is the course of our main problematic in Turkey. The situation of the resident-immigrant relationship in Turkey can be summarized as follows. Throughout its history, Turkey has been a transit country of migration (Sönmez & Kırık, 2017). Therefore, there has always been a migrant problem in Turkey, but this problem has been tried to be solved in accordance with European legislation. Because immigrants using Turkey as a transit country generally chose Europe as their destination. On the other hand, Turkey's ongoing European Union membership process has forced the governments in Turkey to choose a solution in accordance with the EU Legislation so that the immigration issue does not cause different problems with the EU. Another reason for this can be considered as providing social support for government policies by establishing alliances in domestic politics with the promise of governments to make progress regarding the EU process (Elmas, 2016, p. 71). However, considering that Turkey's migration studies have new dynamics that need to be perceived and studied beyond the EU Negotiation process (Eroğlu, 2015, p. 221), it is seen that the migration flows of Syrians that have started since 2011 have a different nature for Turkey.

This nature stems from the fact that migration studies in Turkey have moved away from the discourse of national security in terms of discursiveness and more towards the socio-economic effects of migration (Eroğlu, 2015, p. 221). It is a well-known fact today that eighty percent of the 2 million 950 thousand Syrians (Migration Administration, 2017) in Turkey are considering not to return even if the war in their country is over. It is seen that the Turkish authorities accept that the Syrians want to stay in Turkey and will not return (İçduygu & Millet, 2016, p. 3). Therefore, Turkey has ceased to be a transit country and has become an end country. However, 92% of Syrians in Turkey live in cities (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 8). As a result, it becomes an important problem how the Syrians who stay/will stay in Turkey will establish a network of relations with the settled people in Turkey. It is possible to get a perspective/impression about how this network will be formed from the first Syrian community immigrating to Turkey until today. After the Syrian immigrants, who first lived in the camps and then started to move towards the cities, became more visible in social life and the development of their basic expectations on integration into working life and the education of children (Tunç, 2015, p. 42), the question of how to ensure social cohesion constitutes the agenda. This agenda naturally brought integration or cohesion policies into focus.

However, according to the results of the research conducted by Hacettepe University Migration Research Center (HUGO) in 2014, people living in cities do not seem very satisfied with their urban experience with Syrians (Erdoğan, 2014). As a result, it would not be correct to prepare the policies to be developed on Syrians in Turkey from the perspective of integration or harmonization in the next period. Huntington's systematic comes into play in terms of which perspective should be followed while preparing the next policies. Because when we look at the results of HUGO, the experience of Syrians in Turkey creates social unrest and this social unrest has come to the point of risking political instability. On the other hand, Huntington's systematic point of view can offer a suggestion for a solution to the problem of political instability.

HUNTINGTON'S SYSTEMATICS AND REVISION

Before how the Syrians can be brought into Huntington's systematic perspective, it is necessary to briefly look at Huntington's systematics. Huntington showed the systemat-

ics that resulted in political instability through Formulas 1, 2 and 3:

Formula 1:
(Social Mobilization)/(Economic Development) = Social Frustration

Formula 2:
(Social Frustration)/(Mobilization Opportunities) = Political Participation

Formula 3:
(Political Participation)/(Political Institutionalization) = Political Instability

These formulas (Huntington, 1996, p. 55) are dealt with in a systematic that shows the way to political instability in Huntington's work. This systematic can be seen in the fact that the variable found as a result in the previous formula is found as a divisor in the next formula. For example, in Formula 2, social frustration is the result of the formula, while in formula 3 it is its largest variable (divisor). At this point, it is useful to state one point. Neither Huntington nor the present article see this formulation as a measurable phenomenon in social order. The present article acknowledges that while the social order may have various measurable dimensions, even every measurable dimension has parts that cannot be measured. However, the presence of parts that cannot be measured is not seen as a sufficient argument to exclude these parts from the aforementioned systematic.

The fact that each result constitutes the largest variable of the next formula has resulted in the formulas forming a systematic. The biggest variable in Huntington's systematic, which is one of the social mobility models, is social mobilization, which is in line with the general acceptance of social mobility models. Because "expectations and aspirations created by social mobility in modernizing societies and the inability to satisfy them create an expectation/satisfaction difference and as the dimensions of this difference increase, political participation and instability increase"(Kalaycıoğlu, 1984, p. 218) In the first formula, there is an expectation/satisfaction difference. The lack of economic development causes social frustration. In the second formula, the lack of mobility opportunities to absorb social frustration causes political participation, and the absence of a level of political institutionalization that can handle the increase in political participation causes political instability. Thus, a systematic linking social mobility to political instability occurs within social mobility models.

In the light of this systematic, in order to come to a conclusion about how the Turkish state should develop policies about Syrians, it is necessary to look at what role the state can play in this systematic and what its purpose is. The purpose of the state in this systematic, to put it simply, is to prevent the occurrence of political instability. It is the most important goal and duty of the state to ensure that the result of any social mobility in the society does not lead to instability. Because as a result of political instability, social mobilization will occur again and it will affect the economic development negatively and cause a new social frustration. Although nothing is said about whether there is a cyclical relationship within this systematic in Huntington's study, it is thought that this systematic is cyclical in the article in your hand. This cyclical relationship is intended to continue unless there is a change in its main dynamics, and the continuation of this cycle may cause major and important shifts in the balance of the state and even in the social ground after a point. The main purpose of the state is that this cyclicity does not occur, and even if it does, it is not continuous. For this, it takes it as a duty to implement

the necessary pre-buyer policies and take the measures. Before showing the revisions in these formulas, it is necessary to explain the concepts in the formulas.

Social Mobilization: Social mobilization is handled with the definition of Karl Deutsch. In this sense, it is considered as people's getting ready for the value judgments of a new world as a result of the destruction or disappearance of the social, economic and psychological commitments of the traditional world.

Economic Development: Economic development refers to the growth of total economic activity and can be measured in terms of gross national product per capita.

Social Frustration: Social frustration emerges as a result of the inability to meet the great expectations of the society as a result of social mobilization, or the future wishes and demands, with the development in economic activity. It can be considered as a state of discontent of the society. As a result, the society will want to eliminate the processes and factors that cause the expectations not to be met, or to take a precaution by the state.

Mobility Opportunities: It expresses the potential and ways of realizing the demands, demands and expectations of the society as a result of social mobilization. These roads must be official. Because the real will that determines the possibilities of mobility belongs to the state.

Political Participation: Political participation, like social mobilization, is addressed by Karl Deutsch's definition. Accordingly, political participation is the action of society to influence the decision-makers of decision-makers. Anyone who is a member of the society can show political participation, but in order to be a member of the society, it is necessary to be a citizen of the country in which the individual is located.

Political Institutionalization: Political institutionalization refers to the development of organizations and procedures that can not only manifest the interests of particular social groups, but also reflect the interests of society as a whole, beyond those social groups.

Political Instability: In general, it is the occurrence of disorder at a level that will affect the sustainability of social order and political institutions.

As can be seen in the explanation of the concepts, there is no emphasis on the characteristics of the subjects that make up these concepts. For example, it is unclear whose mobility is mentioned when describing social mobilization, or whose possibilities are referred to when describing mobility opportunities. In general, it would be wrong to expect these details to be mentioned in a conceptualization made for a social mechanism, and it would be a mistake not to privatize this generality for the society in question in studies such as the article you have based on a certain segment of the society. Therefore, some revisions are needed to apply Huntington's general conceptualizations and general mechanism to Syrians in Turkey. This revision is done as follows:

Revised Formula 1:
Social Mobilization^{S}/Economic Development^{Turkey} = Social Frustration^{T}

Revised Formula 2:
Social Frustration^{T}/Mobizilation Opportunities^{R} = Political Participation^{T}

Revised Formula 3:
Political Participation^T/Political Institutionalization^{Turkey} = Political Instability^{Turkey}

The first revision is the S and T characters in the formulas and S stands for Syrians and T for Turkish. In other words, Social Mobilization^S refers to the mobilization of Syrians in Turkey, and Political Participation^T refers to the political participation of Turkish people within the Turkish political system. One point needs to be underlined. As we mentioned at the beginning of our article, the assumption of homogeneity of societies may lead to wrong analysis. In the article in your hand, in order not to fall into the error of the homogeneity assumption, it is planned to separate the variables in the formulas between Syrians and Turkish people. The fact that different structures in the society and different interest groups can affect social frustration is very clear, but the question of "the more social frustration becomes social frustration," has not been answered. Although an answer to the question in question is not sought in this article, Syrians and Turkish people are added to the formulas and shown as different elements in order to avoid the lack of ignoring this difference. The only point in which Syrians are active in this system is due to their mobilization. In other words, in formulas 2 and 3, Syrians take a passive position. Therefore, they do not have the potential to directly affect the political instability in Turkey. For example, there is a possibility that Syrians will be dissatisfied with their living conditions in Turkey and experience social frustration. However, in terms of political instability in Turkey, it is unlikely that the social frustration they experience will directly affect the political instability in Turkey unless they resort to a mass revolt against the state or violent street actions. Considering the social opportunities of Syrians, this possibility seems very weak, so Syrians were not included in the variables in the systematic, except for the first formula.

The second revision was made in the mobility possibilities variable. In all the variables in Huntington's systematic, the society has been accepted as a unitary structure and it has not been emphasized how the differences in the society affect the systematic and political instability. However, when analyzing the path to the political instability of a society in which Syrians enter, it is necessary to separate these two elements in terms of mobility opportunities, just as we separate Turkish and Syrian elements in other components. However, the difference in the mobility elements is due to the fact that the distinction is not denoted by S or T, but rather by R. The R here refers to the concept of relativity and expresses the ratio of the mobility opportunities of Turkish people to those of Syrians. The main reason for taking the rate is that an increase in the mobility opportunities of the Turkish people may reduce the political participation trend that will be created by the social frustration of the Turkish people as a result of the failure to provide an economic development to meet the social mobilization of the Syrians. In order not to overlook this relationship in terms of state policies, relativity has been created in mobility possibilities.

STATE POLICIES IN A REVISED SYSTEMATIC, SYRIANS IN TURKEY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main purpose of our article is to make suggestions for the policies that the Turkish state can follow regarding the Syrians in Turkey, considering the social order and domestic politics. The main reason why Huntington's systematic is mentioned is that a systematic perspective is needed in order for the recommendations to be based on solid foundations. As a result, it is essential to look at how state policies can take a place in

Huntington's systematics. However, it is essential to look at the possibilities of state policies within the revised systematic, both for the whole of our article, and for the suggestions to sit on the right ground.

In Huntington's systematic, there are three main areas/phases in which the state can be directly active in social order and domestic politics. These are Turkey's economic development, relative mobility opportunities and political institutionalization. Although these three areas are areas where the state can be directly involved, they are not areas that operate completely under the control of the state. Therefore, it should identify the areas where the state's intervention capacity is intense in these three areas and establish priority policy development areas on these areas. It is necessary to determine the capacity of the Turkish state to intervene in this inner area, respectively.

Economic development is evaluated as the development of the total economic activity of the society or national income per capita in Huntington's systematic. The course of Turkey's per capita income is shown in Figure 1. Accordingly, there has been a significant breakthrough, especially in the last 14 years. However, after 2010, it is seen that there is a stable period at the level of $10,000. Therefore, according to the first formula, which we can explain as meeting the social mobility experienced in Turkey with the level of economic development, social mobility must have been at a very low course so that the Turkish society did not experience social frustration. However, it is thought that the increasing trend of social mobility in Turkey continued after 2010. As a result, it is seen that social frustration in Turkey tends to increase after 2010. A point should be made here, and it can be criticized because Huntington attributes social frustration only to economic development, and therefore he does not see the effect of social events on social frustration. On the other hand, considering that social events can negatively affect the economic development of the country, the effect of social events on social frustration is also indirectly addressed within the Huntington systematic. As a result, the stagnation in per capita income, especially since 2010, increases the possibility of social frustration.

On the other hand, it is necessary to express one more point regarding the question of whether there is social frustration in Turkey as a result of the stagnation in economic development. The events experienced in Turkey since 2010 have caused social frustration in one part of the stagnation in Turkey, while the other part has had a consolidating nature. First of all, the number of people in Turkey has almost dropped to two as pro-Erdogan and anti-Erdogan; On the other hand, Erdoğan supporters became a consolidated bloc, while Erdoğan's opponents experienced great social frustration. For example, the Gezi protests and the democracy rallies are the two biggest examples of divisiveness. While the people who were against Erdoğan during the Gezi events talked about their disappointment, it can be said that the supporters of Erdoğan experienced a serious consolidation in the democracy rallies. But at this point, the revised version of Huntington's systematic makes an important contribution. The main explanation for the fact that one part of the society is frustrated by the events and the other is consolidated behind their political preferences is the perception of social mobility by the segments rather than the reality of economic development. If social mobility is welcomed by any segment, but there is no improvement in the economy, this segment is frustrated; If one looks at a segment that negatively views social mobility, then the economic recovery has a consolidating effect. In this sense, formula 1 can be revised as follows:

$$A(\text{Social Mobilization}^S)/\text{Economic Development}^{\text{Turkey}} = \text{Social Frustration}^T$$

According to this revision, the A function expresses the perception of the respondents about the social mobilization. If the result of this equation is negative, it is inevitable for that segment to fall into social frustration. Therefore, even if a country is experiencing a very important economic development, a negative perception about any social mobilization will cause social frustration in that regard. We can give an example in this regard through the Syrians in Turkey.

Assuming that there has been a serious economic breakthrough in Turkey since 2017, will this assumption eliminate the social frustration about Syrians? The answer to this question in this article is no, as long as the negative perception about the social mobilization of Syrians in Turkey does not change. Because it will be thought that the mobilization of the Syrians constitutes an important handicap in the distribution of the growing cake in the economy. This, in turn, would have the potential to cause social frustration for Syrians and result in political instability. According to the results of the field research conducted by Hacettepe University in 2014, while there are 1.6 million Syrians in Turkey, there is a high percentage of participants who say that other Syrians should never be accepted, while Turkish people do not take a firm stance in favor of the presence of Syrians and their rejection. In 2017, the number of Syrians in Turkey reached 3 million and almost doubled in 2014. In addition, the high rate of people who think that Syrians should be accommodated in camps and not allowed to live in cities indicates the existence of a segment that is uncomfortable with the social mobility of Syrians. This situation increases the possibility of Turkish people to experience social frustration regarding Syrians, especially in a period when economic development is stagnant.

In this direction, in terms of economic development, which is one of the three phases in which the state can intervene, it can be expected that the state will produce two types of policies. One of them is about the divisor part of formula 1, and the other is about the divisor part. In other words, the state can either aim to increase economic development by concentrating on policies that will increase total economic activity, or it can turn to policies to manage the perception of social mobilization in society in parallel with the course of economic development. At this point, considering the abundance and diversity of factors that will determine economic development, many economic activities that can be experienced outside the control of the state have the potential to negatively affect economic development. However, considering that Turkey is based on a market economy, the state's intervention tools to directly affect economic development are also limited. Although it has the ability to give incentives for the goods and services market and the money market and to determine the direction of the markets by determining policy rates, the effects of these capabilities may have limitations. Therefore, directing the public perception of the social mobilization of Syrians by the state is one of the policies that the state can implement in this phase. The main issue here is to make the society feel that the social mobilization of Syrians is under the control of the state. Public service announcements to be shown in the media and local governments' contact with the public more frequently, continuously and practically can play an important role in the formation of this perception in the society.

Mobility Opportunities constitute another of the intervention areas of the state within the Huntington systematic. It is certain that the mobilization of the society can take place within certain possibilities, and it is the state that determines these possibilities. Laws, statutes, regulations etc. With legislation, the state determines the movement areas of the society and sometimes narrows and sometimes expands these areas according to

the conditions. However, it is certain that the entire society does not remain within the boundaries drawn by the state. The most important example of this is the existence of the informal economy. The fact that the society can mobilize beyond the borders drawn by the state results in mobility opportunities moving between two extremes, legal and illegal. Consequently, the mobility possibilities in the Huntington systematics are subject to a second revision. Accordingly, while evaluating mobility possibilities, they will also be evaluated according to whether they are legal or illegal. In the first revision, since the mobility opportunities were evaluated according to the relativity between the Turkish and the Syrians, it is possible to make the evaluation regarding the mobility opportunities as follows. If Turkish people act within legal mobility opportunities, while Syrians continue their lives with illegal mobility opportunities and this situation is noticed by the society, the result means a decrease in relative mobility opportunities. Because while a certain part of the society stays within the borders drawn for it, another can go outside the borders drawn for it. This result, when combined with the assumption that the society is in a social frustration, naturally has a nature that will increase the political participation of the frustrated society.

The ways that the state can follow in order to develop policy in the mobility possibilities phase seem more flexible than in the other phases. Especially in a country where social consolidation is achieved on the political ground, the state can determine, change and implement the mobility opportunities more flexibly and comfortably. Therefore, the phase in which the state can act most comfortably and flexibly in Huntington's systematic is the phase of mobility possibilities. At this point, while determining the mobility opportunities of Syrians, it is very important to accurately determine the Turkish people's feelings about their own mobility opportunities. If Turks are faced with the harsh face of the state for going beyond their legal mobility opportunities, and if they feel that the Syrians do not recognize the borders of the state regarding their mobility opportunities, the potential of the Turks to show political participation in the issue of Syrians will increase. It is useful to state that political participation here is a negative political participation. Increasing political participation in democracies is, on the contrary, encouraged and desired. But here, the main reason for considering political participation in a negative dimension is the potential to increase the likelihood of political instability. In other words, considering political participation as a negative data is not due to its own nature, but to the nature of its result.

Political Institutionalization is the third and final phase in which the state can be involved in Huntington's systematics. By definition, the existence of institutions that are established with or without the help of the state, whose main purpose is to meet the needs of the society, is one of the most important reasons for political institutionalization. The main purpose here is to meet the needs of the society. The lack of institutions that meet the needs makes the existing political participation of the society the most visible and primary factor of political instability. This institutionalization need not be done by the state alone. On the contrary, some NGOs established by civil society can handle the needs that the state has difficulty in meeting, by their own means, and prevent a mobilization or frustration arising from that need. For example, the existence of humanitarian aid associations has a nature that reduces the impact of the political participation of the society by ensuring that people in need of help continue their lives in a continuous and sustainable way.

Political institutionalization, by its very nature, may seem like a process in which the state can easily get involved and even be an actor. However, although it was decided to

be established, it is possible to produce a response to the needs in the first and second phases, from the establishment to the establishment of an effective activity in the field. Therefore, although institutionalization is a phase in which the direct influence capacity of the state is high, its social impact is more likely to be slow. In terms of responding to the need, the state's efforts to institutionalize it with its own hand, as well as its support to non-governmental organizations, have a quality that reduces the possibility of political instability. In Turkey, on the other hand, political institutionalization should be undertaken not only by the state, but also by NGOs, and at this point, they should receive support from the state. There is no non-governmental organization established specifically for Syrians in Turkey. In general, the lack of a non-governmental organization dealing with Syrians, apart from humanitarian aid associations and a few academic research centers, weakens Turkey's political institutionalization. The fact that the Turkish state made AFAD responsible for the Syrians until 2015 and declared the General Directorate of Migration Management as the main responsible after 2015 gives the impression that the pace of political institutionalization does not quite match the facts. Because the mobilization of Syrians from the camps to the cities has been experienced since the end of 2013 and in the meantime, they started to settle in various parts of the cities. On the other hand, it is an important mistake that the state places the camps in the center, not the city life, regarding the Syrians. Likewise, waiting for the issue of Syrians living in cities to be handled only by state institutions and not expecting NGOs to deal with this issue has the potential to result in the same slowness in political institutionalization being experienced again. As a result, the most important policy that the state should follow at this point will be to encourage and support the civil society part of political institutionalization towards Syrians.

CONCLUSION

It is certain that the Syrians in Turkey will have an impact on Turkey's domestic policy and social order, and it can even be thought that they have already done so – and this article has been written with the thought that it has an impact at the moment. So how can this effect be and how should it be read? Classical immigrant studies, in general, either focus on integration/cohesion policies or remain descriptive, as they put immigrants in a passive position. It would be misleading to approach the issue of Syrians in Turkey from this perspective.

Considering that it is necessary to approach the subject more systematically than within the framework of social order and domestic politics, the systematic viewpoint of Huntington's book titled "Political Order in Changing Societies" has been utilized. Although there are important differences between the international political environment at the time Huntington wrote and today, it was concluded that the general social dynamics operate in the same way today and it was thought that Huntington's systematic could be adapted to the Syrians problem in Turkey with some revisions. In this respect, the application of the revised Huntington's systematic on the Syrian problem has been made and some suggestions have been made for the policies that the state can follow. These suggestions are gathered under the titles of political institutionalization, mobility opportunities and economic development in the last part of the article. The article in your hand aims to be a modest contribution and trigger of a deep discussion on the issue of Syrians, which we think will constitute one of the important agenda items of the whole society in the future.

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