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FROM POLITICAL ISLAM TO ISLAMIC POLITICS

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ABSTRACT

Despite the deep analytical legacy on political Islam movements in Turkey, this paper agrees in the absence of the impact of civil society on the journey of political Islam movements in the literature. This paper examines the political Islam movement in Turkey from the perspective of Ibn Khaldun on changes in the political system of a community. The Bedouin-Hadara struggle is at the core of this examination in the first section, and this article first explains how the bedouin-hadara struggle shapes the political system of that community and the cycling effect of the political system on this struggle. The second section tries to integrate civil society into the journey of political parties. This effort opens a new perspective on political Islam studies such as the connectedness between political Islam and non-political daily life. The third section reveals the re-reading of the journey of political Islam by integrating civil society with the help of Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory. Lastly, the article concludes.

Keywords: Ibn Khaldun, Political Islam, Turkey, AK Party, National Vision Movement

Author's Areas of Interest: Public Management, Administrative Culture, Turkish Politics, Bureaucracy

INTRODUCTION

The journey of Political Islam in Turkey is very concerned in recent years. The transformative impact of Erdogan's leadership on Turkey's politics has very much raised these concerns. On the other hand, the journey of Political Islam in Turkey doesn't consist only of Erdogan's leadership, and therefore, all studies about it start the journey from the launch of the National Vision movement. Maybe, due to its more longevity, National Vision Movement can have more affected the ongoing political Islam in Turkey. Martin and Barzegar (2010), Sabet (2008), Eligür (2010), Linjakumpu (2008), Waardenburg (2002), Rabasa and Larrabee (2008) etc. has studied on political Islam in Turkey. On the other hand, this paper argues the failure of studying political Islam only from stories of political parties. Political Islam has another very important and also the base of political parties. This part is the civil Muslim society and it can be named as the forgotten start point of the political Islam movement in Turkey.

Despite the deep analytical legacy on political Islam movements in Turkey, this paper agrees in the absence of the impact of civil society on the journey of political Islam movements in the literature. However, political Islam couldn't be limited to the politics and the analytical frameworks of political science. Because of the impartiality of civil society from the political life, studies on political Islam must include the social dimensions of ordinary Muslim citizens. The integration of social dimensions and political movements is, in contrast, a very hard issue to study (Baali, 1988). Although there are many conceptual frameworks in the literature, this paper prefers to take Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory on the Bedouins-Hadaras struggle for authority on the Castle. The appropriateness of Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory for this paper is resourced by its coherent approach to the relationship between civil society and the political actors (Alatas, 2014).

In contrast to the modern approaches, Ibn Khaldun saw civil society and the political actors as the same parts of political movements. Therefore, political leaders are not those who tried to gain the support of inactive civil society, but they are the representatives of the active civil society for their purpose. Even though the political Islam movements in the 20th century has been acting in a representative democratic system, their representativeness was never independent from Muslim communities. Muslim communities have determinative effects on the political actors of political Islam. This paper examines the political Islam movement in Turkey from the perspective of Ibn Khaldun on changes in the political system of a community. The Bedouin-Hadara struggle is at the core of this examination in the first section, and this article first explains

how the bedouin-hadara struggle shapes the political system of that community and the cycling effect of the political system on this struggle. The second section tries to integrate civil society into the journey of political parties. This effort opens a new perspective on political Islam studies such as the connectedness between political Islam and non-political daily life. The third section reveals the re-reading of the journey of political Islam by integrating civil society with the help of Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory. Lastly, the article concludes.

THE BEDOUIN-HADARA STRUGGLE IN IBN KHALDUN

Ibn Khaldun was a very important philosopher in Islamic thought history who has been also called "the father of sociology" in Islamic thought. Therefore, studies on Muslim communities must take care of his workings, and they may also study more on Ibn Khaldun. Beyond mostly-known concepts like umran and asabiyyah in Ibn Khaldun's philosophy social structure, his framework of bedouin-hadara struggle suggests very interesting analysis tools for socio-political change and the rise and falls of sovereign powers (Önder & Ulaşan, 2018). Moreover, his concepts and frameworks can apply to the post-hegemonic world order, for Cox (Cox, 1992). In this section, this bedouin-hadara struggle will be introduced in terms of its effects on the socio-political system.

Very briefly, for Ibn Khaldun, a community consists of two important identities called bedouin and hadara. The Bedouins are the poor and uncivilized people in that community who lives out of the castle of hadara who are the rich and civilized people living in the Castle. They don't have any prosperity rights, any equality of opportunities in the community. They cannot reach the opportunities in the castle of hadara and also have no information about the opportunities within the castle of the hadara. On the other hand, hadaras don't want bedouins to know anything about the opportunities in the castle not to share them with bedouins. However, this situation of bedouins and hadaras isn't perpetual, and on its own time, bedouins understand their wealth difference from hadaras. This is the motivational and momentum point at which bedouins start to believe in the existence of their rights to utilize those opportunities (Ibn-Khaldūn & Rosenthal, 1987). This is also the starting point of socio-political change in Ibn Khaldun.

Ibn Khaldun explained the change process by focusing on the journey of the Bedouin movement. For him, this change process is the journey of the conquest of Hadara's castle by Bedouins. However, Bedouins must get into the three important steps for a successful last attack for conquering. The three

steps are 1. psychological step, 2. preparation step, and 3. attacking step. For Ibn Khaldun, all potential bedouins in all societies have experienced these three steps for a successful conquering attack and to take a share from the wealth in the Hadaras Castle (Ibn-□aldūn & Rosenthal, 1987). Lastly to the introduction, the analysis based on Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory must be made at the micro-political level at the psychological level, at the institutional level in the preparation step, at the macro-political level in the attack step. Therefore, this paper changes the naming of steps as the following; 1. Micro-political level, 2. Institutional level, and 3. Macro-political level.

The first step is about the psychological conditions of Bedouins. At the beginning of this step, Bedouins are aware of their poverty, but they don't believe that they can alleviate the poverty. The more Bedouins recognize the opportunities of Hadaras Castle, the more their belief and encouragement themselves to alleviate the poverty increases, too. Whereas the leaders of Bedouins early awaken to the opportunities, the recognition of ordinary members of the Bedouin community takes a longer time. Additionally, transferring this self-encouragement to social consciousness happens in a period, shorter or longer depending on the psychological capabilities of the community. As a result, the self-encouragement period is called the psychological step.

The second step is about obtaining the right and necessary tools for the strong last attack against the Hadaras to conquer the castle. This step takes the longest time, indeed, because it includes efforts for maintaining motivation, obtaining equipment, increasing education, earning capital, for raising investigation activities. For example, earning the capital to obtain a sufficient amount of military equipment for the last strong attack requires privacy, hardworking and well-directed strategies to succeed. On the other hand, maintaining asabiyah and motivation at the same level within the Bedouin community is very hard throughout this step because some of Bedouin community members cannot believe in the possibility of salvation from nomadism. Therefore, the Bedouin community has the potential to produce something harmful to its success, also. Additionally, those non-believers can change from time to time and case-by-case.

This changeability makes the failure risk very dynamic and also makes a nonstop struggle against itself required. On the other hand, not only inner conditions but also environmental conditions have important impacts on the Bedouins' success in this step. To obtain the necessary and sufficient equipment, Bedouins must buy first war equipment like a sword. However, the domination of Hadaras in the war-equipment market can put the clamps on Bedouins'rise.

Therefore, the secrecy of Bedouins' efforts in this step is also very important. As a result, Khaldun called this step the longest period of Bedouins' struggle-cycle.

The third and last step is totally about the war against Hadaras and means a life or death issue for Bedouins. If they are successful in the war, they conquer the castle and the Hadara government ends. If they fail, then they cannot survive as a separate community from Hadaras. Additionally, the domination of Hadaras government will strengthen. The successfulness of Bedouins depends on their capabilities, strategies, preparation, asabiyah, motivation. Ibn Khaldun generalizes that Bedouins are the victors of wars against Hadaras because of their relaxivity against Bedouins, especially in the preparation step. Clashes of interest between the elites within Hadaras are also another significant cause of their failure in the war against Bedouins. By utilizing those clashes, the leaders of Bedouins can succeed to split their enemies, and they can also compromise with one part within Hadaras. The overconfidence of Hadaras is another usual cause of the failure of Hadaras, for Ibn Khaldun. The overconfidence causes also relaxivity and insufficient preparation for the war with Bedouins. As the result, the wars between Bedouins and Hadaras usually result in the victory of Bedouins, not due to the strength of Bedouins but due to their weaknesses.

Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory seems not to have any relation to social change, but relating to a war environment in the pre-modernity era. However, the aftermath of the Bedouins' victory usually results in the transformation of victorious Bedouins to the new Hadaras. This paper agrees that his analysis framework includes many ideas for social changes in the modernity as well as post-modernity era because of the analytical tools on the transformation of Bedouins both in before and after periods of the war (Cox, 1992). Especially, his analytical framework can be generally applicable to Turkish politics in which any community can be felt alienated from other ideological, ethnic and religious, etc. parties. Because of such alienations, the struggle between different identities in Turkish politics becomes an unavoidable feature of Turkish politics. Therefore, Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory is very applicable to Turkish politics and this article applies it to the journey of political Islam. Additionally, the application of a Muslim philosopher's framework has the potential for very interesting inferences about political Islam and will be very contributive to the literature on political Islam movements all over the world.

RE-READING OF POLITICAL ISLAM MOVEMENT IN TUR-KEY

Reading the political Islam movement in Turkey should start from the end of the First World War. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire caused Muslims to become the new Bedouins in international politics because they lost their castle and all prosperity even in their lands like the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa. In addition to the references to Ottoman Empire by political Islam leaders in Turkey, the position of the Ottoman Empire in incumbent international politics shifts it to the center of political Islam. Its western counter-partners in its classical period have also referred to the Islamic characteristics and the protective role of the Ottoman Empire for Islam. Because it ended up in the 20th century, any political movement having claims on Islam must be automatically related to Ottoman Empire (İnalcık, 2000). Additionally, the relation of political Islam movements in Turkey with the Ottoman Empire arises not only from its Islamic characteristics but also from Turkish characteristics (Eligur, 2010). Therefore, because of the stronger relations of political Islam movements in Turkey with the Ottoman Empire, this paper preferred to start their psychological step from the end of the Ottoman Empire.

I. MICRO-POLITICAL STEP OF POLITICAL ISLAM MOVEMENTS

Even though the end of the Ottoman Empire is the start point of political Islam, it wasn't the sole determinant of the psychological step of political Islam movements in Turkey. The establishment of a secularist regime has also a destructive psychological effect on Muslims. Because the micro-political level is the level of analysis in the psychological step, Muslims and their psychology are at the core of the analysis. The hard policies of the secularist regime against Islam and Muslims had doubled the destructive psychological effect for Muslims. Therefore, the beginning of the self-encouragement of Muslims starts from the destruction of the destructive effect. However, the hard policies of the secularist regime against Muslims made this destruction effort also very hard. Believing in the re-gaining of the lost prosperity couldn't become widespread among Muslims.

In the first two decades of the Turkish Republic, many Islamic signals have experienced many transformations. As the political Islam movements continuously referred, for example, the Adhan had changed from its Arabic version to Turkish version. Islamic education was prohibited. The Hagia Sophia was closed to praying in it and its official status was changed from mosque to museum. Covering headscarves in state institutions and education was

also prohibited for long years. These prohibitions make belief in the re-gaining of the lost prosperity very hard. In consequence, the return of Ad-han to its original Arabic version, the return of Hagia Sophia's status to the mosque, the liberation of Islamic signs in daily life like the headscarf becomes the motivation resource of political Islam movements in Turkey.

After the start point of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the psychological step has experienced also some revival efforts, too, beyond the destructive develop-ments. Maybe like all similar ideological movements, political Islam movements in Turkey have started their revival efforts in literary publishing. Poets, books, journals were the platforms in which Islamic thoughts had been addressed. As these journals had widespread within Muslims society, the motivation of the Muslim community has very barely increased. In the first decade of the Turkish Republic, some politicians have tried to take place in politics especially in the trials for transition to the multi-party democratic system. However, because all of them were individual efforts, this paper accepts them in the micro-political step. However, the failures of trials for the multy-party system due to various reasons had also negative impacts on the motivations of the Muslim community.

On the other hand, the selection of Necmeddin Erbakan as the President of The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) in May 1969 can be called the end of the micro-political step and as the start of the institutional step. Indeed, in terms of the reflection of Ibn Khaldun's change mechanism in the modern and post-modern era, the basic symbol of the transition from micro-political step to institutional step is the establish-ment of a political party that has Islamic claims. However, because Erbakan was the leader of the first political party with Islamic claims, his presidency of TOBB can be considered as a part of the institutional step. His presidency also gave the motivation Muslim community to make investments and to earn necessary and sufficient capital for the macro-political step (Baykal, 2021).

II.   INSTITUTIONAL STEP OF POLITICAL ISLAM MOVEMENTS

The establishment of the National Vision Movement (NVM) and its journey to come to the governance of Turkey has comprised the whole institution-al step of political Islam movements. Therefore, the experiences of NVM tell everything about the institutional step. In the beginning, the NVM seemed to be composed of the ideals of Necmeddin Erbakan in Turkish politics. The three parties led by Erbakan were closed by the Constitutional Court due to the claims that they were at the origin of anti-secularist activities and orga-nizations (Kartal, 2020). On the other hand, Erbakan has launched a new

party with a different name after all 'close decisions'. His decisiveness to be in Turkish politics was also, on the other hand, the exact end of the micro-political step of political Islam movements. Indeed, the presence of the National Order Party (MNP) in the coalition of the Republican People's Party (CHP) was the biggest development in the journey of political Islam movements in Turkey. After a very short life of MNP, Erbakan has launched National Salvation Party (MSP) and it had a very important role in Turkish foreign policy.

The role of MSP in the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 could be called an early attempt to start the attack on the castle of Hadaras, which were secular regime institutions in Turkey. Representatives of MNP and of political Islam movements stated many times that Erbakan as the vice-Prime Minister of Turkey has commanded the Army to start the operation despite the opposition of the incumbent Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit who was also the president of CHP. For those representatives, Erbakan has waited for the international visits of Ecevit to get the authorization to command the Army (Baykal & Çaha, 2021). These declarations of representatives showed the early efforts to start the attack on the castle of secularists. However, the military coup in 1980 has broken not only the efforts of political Islam movements but also the increase of other ideological and ideational movements.

Another important turning point for the political Islam movements in Turkey was the government of the Wealth Party between 1996 and the Municipality elections in 1994. In the 1994 elections, Wealth Party under Erbakan's leadership has won the presidency of three municipalities which were Istanbul, Ankara, and Diyarbakır. These three Municipalities were very important for the secularist regime and also for political Islam movements. For the secularist regime, any loss in any elections meant the success of political Islam movements. For Political Islam movements, Istanbul was the economic capital city of Turkey and Diyarbakir was very important for reaching the Kurdish issue. Ankara was already important because it was the capital city of Turkey, and therefore, it was at the heart of the state bureaucracy. As a result, the victory of the Wealth Party can be considered as the starting point of the macro-political step of political Islam movements in Turkey. However, like MSP, the Wealth Party was also closed in 1998 and its governance has been ended by a post-modern military coup.

In conclusion, the Wealth Party governance era can be called the third unsuccessful attack of political Islam movements to get control of the castle of the Secularist regime in Turkey. However, under the Wealth Party governance, many issues like headscarves in public institutions and education,

the return of Hagia Sophia to a mosque, the liberation of Quran education, and of Islamic foundations couldn't be completely resolved. Indeed, the victory of a post-modern military coup to overthrow the Wealth Party government means also the incomplete institutionalization of political Islam movements in Turkey to overthrow the secularist regime. Additionally, the coalition partner, True Path Party (DYP), also didn't support the Wealth Party against the coup despite its center-right politics and partially Islamic discourse. It also reflected the broken line in the asabiyah level of the Muslim community as Ibn Khaldun claimed as a reason for the unsuccessfulness of any Bedouins movement. However, it must be noticed that the trial for Wealth Party between 1994 and 1997 was stronger than the trial of MSP amid the Cyprus Peace Operation to start the final attack on the castle of the secularist regime. Finally, the transition to the macro-political step has been broken until the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government.

III.   MACRO-POLITICAL STEP OF POLITICAL ISLAM MOVEMENTS

The AK Party has come to the governance in a very important conjecture for Turkish domestic and international politics with very high claims. The governance of the AK Party government has also transition effects on the political Islam movements. For an earlier conclusion, under the AK Party governance for 20 years, Turkey experienced the victory of Bedouins, the transformation of old Bedouins to new Hadaras, and lastly the launch of the new Bedouin community in Turkish politics. In other words, political Islam movements in Turkey have won the final attack on the secularists' castle; they become the new owners of the castle and gained Hadara characteristics; and, they also saw the launch of a new Bedouin community consisting of newly-formed secularists and new local identities. In this section, the re-reading of the historical process of the AK Party government will be made under these three stages.

The destructive economic crisis of Turkey in 2001 and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in 2003 were the most important issues of Turkish politics while AK Party has come to the governance. However, the AK Party governance has a very different character from its predecessor Wealth Party in terms of the journey of political Islam. While Wealth Party was perceived and accepted as the threat to the regime of Turkey because of its political Islamic discourses, the AK Party government has been perceived and accepted as the savior of the Turkish economy with its a few differentiated political Islamic characteristics. Erdogan, the leader of the AK Party and also the former president of Istanbul Municipality in 1994, has said that 'AK Party has taken off the National Vision Movement's shirt'.

AK Party has accepted conservative democracy as its basic ideology and it never would follow the path of the National Vision Movement. For example, it would give the priority to save the Turkish economy from the debt crisis in 2001 and to solve structural problems to reach sustainable economic growth. In contrast to the Erbakan's government, Erdogan didn't take the classical problems of political Islam like the headscarf in public institutions at the beginning although it has a sufficient majority in the Turkish Assembly to solve those problems. Erdogan's preference not to take them to his agenda also caused him to be criticized in the Muslim community that has been waiting for such a majority for long years.

In addition to domestic politics, Erdogan's government didn't have similar preferences with Erbakan's government in foreign policy, too. Erbakan has launched D-8 consisting of eight Islam countries in the world to establish an economic partnership and political alliance between them. However, Erdogan's government took the European Union full membership process as the first priority in foreign policy which was also the first priority of the secularist regime and which was called by Erbakan as the Christianity Union. The contrasting positions of the AK Party and National Vision Movement can be exemplified with various events like the co-chairmanship of the Great Middle East Project, strengthening alliance with Israel. Erbakan has so much criticized Erdogan about such policies as the leader of Felicity Party (SP) since 2003 to this death. Despite the hard criticization of his opponents, Erdogan's government has always protected its conservative characteristics behind the domination of democratic characteristics.

The domination of democratic characteristics has brought the chance to harm so much the castle of the secularist regime. As the constitutional reform in 2010 was claimed as based on democratic values and as it was totally rejected by secularist parties and elites, it can be called the final attack on the castle of secularism in Turkey. Although this final attack, referred to in Ibn Khaldun, and could reach success with the help of another secular community to the Kemalist secularists, inheritors of political Islam movements were at the leadership of this final attack. As the destiny of political Islam has been much discussed in recent years in Turkey, this paper agrees that the journey of political Islam started at the end of the Ottoman Empire and ended at the Constitutional Reform in 2010. Indeed, many analysts can think of the change in the election system of the President of Turkey as the final attack of political Islam to the secularist castle.

However, this paper argues that this change in the election system is not part of the last step of the journey of political Islam movements in the 20th century; but it is part of the first step of political Islam movements in the 21st century. As Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory suggested that a new cycle for a Bedouin movement starts after the end of the cycle focused, this argument sounds very consistent. After the 2010 Constitution Reform, political Islam movements have introduced a new cycle and phase. In Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory, this must be the new micro-political or psychological step of the news cycle. Therefore from Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory, the Muslim community in Turkey will get on a new journey and this paper argues in the 2010 Constitution Reform as the starting point.

It also means that Muslims in political Islam movements of the 20th century have been challenged by being the new Hadaras in the new cycle as the victors of the 20th cycle. From the reverse perspective, they are also challenged by the launch of the new Bedouins community. As a forecast, if the general rule of Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory that Hadaras lose, the Muslim community must be the next loser. On the other hand, as Ibn Khaldun suggested again, the status of the Muslim community in the next cycle will be determined by the preferences of Muslim communities in the micro-political step of the news cycle.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper tries to re-read the historical journey of political Islam movements in Turkey. In the literature, political actors of political Islam movements usually are analyzed as separate from the civil society. This paper considers that such interpretations miss the determinative effects of civil society on the destiny of political Islam movements. Their historical legacy and cumulative structure cannot be ignored in the analysis and predictions of the future of Muslim communities. Because of such failures, this paper argues the contribution of Ibn Khaldun's Cyclical Theory to this field because of its focus on the historical legacy. In the examination, the start point of political Islam's journey is the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the endpoint is the Constitutional Reform in 2010 in the Turkish Republic. In this respect, this article suggests that political Islam movements in Turkey are in the new micro-political step as Muslims' psychology is shaping. The dynamics of this new micro-political step must be studied in further researches.

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